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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A police officer arrested Kody D. Feltman for driving under the influence of alcohol and
took him to the county jail. In the jail sally port, Mr. Feltman spit on a detention officer. The
State charged him with propelling bodily fluids and driving under the influence ("DUI").
Before trial, Mr. Feltman requested jury instructions on the propelling bodily fluids
offense. He argued that the jury must be instructed to find that he was a pretrial detainee as an
essential element of the offense. At a pretrial hearing, the district court rejected his proposed
instructions. Accordingly, at trial, the State presented no evidence on whether Mr. Feltman was a
pretrial detainee, and the jury was not instructed on this element. Also at trial, the district court
excluded any evidence of Mr. Feltman's mental illness to counter the State's impairment theory
for the DUI. The jury found Mr. Feltman guilty of both offenses.
Mr. Feltman now appeals. He raises three related errors on the pretrial detainee element
of propelling bodily fluids. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding his lay witness testimony of his mental illness.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 31, 201 7, Sergeant Howe with the Twin Falls Police Department stopped a
truck driven by Mr. Feltman for reckless driving and suspicion of a DUI. (Tr. Vol. 111,1 p.108,
Ls.12-19, p.110, L.3-p.112, L.14, p.112, Ls.18-24; see Howe 000-407, State's Ex. 1, 1:02-3:53

1

There are five transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a motion hearing,
held on August 27, 2018. The second, cited as Volume II, contains another motion hearing, held
on August 28, 2018. The third, cited as Volume III, contains day one of the jury trial, held on
August 29, 2018. The fourth, cited as Volume IV, contains day two of the jury trial, held on
August 30, 2018. The fifth, cited as Volume V, contains the sentencing hearing, held on
January 28, 2019.
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(initial traffic stop encounter).) Sergeant Howe arrested Mr. Feltman for a DUI and put him in
the back of a patrol car. (Tr. Vol. III, p.129, L.24-p.130, L.3; see Howe 609-1252, State's Ex. 1,
2:25-6:37 (arrest and placement in car).) Another Twin Falls police officer drove Mr. Feltman to
the Twin Falls County Jail and pulled into the sally port, which is "basically a big garage."
(Tr. Vol. III, p.136, Ls.15-22, p.175, Ls.13-19; State's Ex. 3, 2:11-3:10.) Deputy Ballard, a
detention officer with the Twin Falls Sheriffs Office, went to get Mr. Feltman out of the car.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.183, Ls.8-20, p.185, Ls.3-8.) While Deputy Ballard was talking to Mr. Feltman
at the car door, Mr. Feltman spit on him. (Tr. Vol. III, p.139, Ls.12-25, p.185, Ls.5-9; see Howe
2318-2502, State's Ex. 1, 00:07-1 :08 (sally port interaction and spitting).) Mr. Feltman had not
yet been booked in the jail. (Tr. Vol. III, p.147, Ls.14-16.) Later, Sergeant Howe took
Mr. Feltman to the hospital for a blood draw. (Tr. Vol. III, p.144, L.4-p.145, L.23.) His blood
alcohol concentration was .256. (Tr. Vol. III, p.146, Ls.17-18; State's Ex. 2.)
Consequently, on January 2, 2018, the State filed a criminal complaint alleging that
Mr. Feltman committed battery on a peace officer, sheriff, or police officer, for spitting on
Deputy Ballard, in violation of LC. §§ 18-903 and 18-915(3), and a misdemeanor DUI (second
violation within ten years). (R., pp .12-14.) Before the preliminary hearing, the magistrate
committed Mr. Feltman to the State Hospital because he was not competent to proceed with the
case against him. (R., pp.38-39.) The magistrate terminated his commitment once he was
deemed fit to proceed, about two months later. (R., pp.48--49.) Mr. Feltman then waived a
preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to district court. (R., pp.52, 53.) The
State filed an Information charging Mr. Feltman with battery on a peace officer, sheriff, or police
officer and a DUI. (R., pp.55-57.) Mr. Feltman pled not guilty. (R., p.60.)
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Before trial, the State filed an Amended Information to change the battery charge to
propelling bodily fluids at certain persons, in violation of LC. § 18-915B. (R., pp.76-78.) The
State charged:
That the Defendant, KODY DEAN FELTMAN, on or about December 31, 2017,
in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, did knowingly propel bodily fluid at a
detention officer, correctional officer, or employee of a county correctional
facility, while the Defendant was being transported or supervised by a
correctional officer or detention officer, in violation of Idaho Code Sections [sic]
18-915B.
(R., p.77.) Mr. Feltman did not object to the amended filing. (R., p.75.) For the DUI, the State
alleged that Mr. Feltman committed this offense under both the per se and impairment theories of
intoxication. (R., p.77.)
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Feltman moved for jury instructions for the amended charge of
propelling bodily fluids. (R., pp.80-84.) He argued that LC. § 18-915B was limited to sentenced
prisoners and pretrial detainees. (R., pp.81-84.) Since Mr. Feltman was not a sentenced prisoner,
he argued that the elements instruction for propelling bodily fluids must include a "pretrial
detainee" finding. (R., pp.81-84, 87, 89.) Specifically, he requested:
1. On or about December 31, 2018, 2
2. in the state ofldaho,
3. the defendant Kody Dean Feltman did knowingly propel bodily fluid upon a
correctional officer,
4. while Kody Dean Feltman was a pretrial detainee being transported or
supervised by a correctional officer.
(R., p.89.) He also requested that the jury be instructed on the definition of a pretrial detainee as

"a person who has been arrested and brought before a judicial officer for arraignment on a
charge, but who has not yet been tried on the charge." (R., p.90; see also R., p.81-84, 87, 90;

3

Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.16-p.7, L.9.) At a hearing, the State objected to Mr. Feltman's proposed
instructions. (Tr. Vol. I, p.13, L.11-p.15, L.14.) The State proposed an instruction without a
pretrial detainee element:
1. On or about December 31, 201 7,
2. in the state ofldaho,
3. the defendant Kody Dean Feltman did knowingly propel bodily fluid at a
detention officer, correctional officer, or employee of a county correctional
facility,
4. while the defendant Kody Dean Feltman was being transported or supervised
by a correctional officer or detention officer.
(R., p.92.) The State conceded that, if Mr. Feltman's instructions were given, "there's no way" to
prove he was a pretrial detainee because "there's been no probable cause determination made by
a magistrate at the time this crime occurred." (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.18-p.9, L.3.) The district court3
declined to rule on the issue until the next hearing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.19-p.18, L.14.)
At the next hearing, Mr. Feltman objected to the State's proposed instruction and
reiterated his argument that LC. § 18-915B applied to sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees
only. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.17-p.8, L.25, p.11, L.19-p.12, L.11.) The State disagreed and argued
that the statute applied to any person. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, L.3-p.11, L.16.) The district court
determined that LC. § 18-915B was not limited to sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.3-19.) The district court rejected Mr. Feltman's proposed instructions and
thus would not require the jury to find that Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee at the time of the
alleged offense. (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L.20-p.15, L.3.) The district court adopted the State's

2

3

The correct year is 2017. (See R., p.77.)
A different district court judge presided over this hearing.
4

proposed instruction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, Ls.14-15; Compare R., p.92, with R., p.124; Tr. Vol. III,
p.202, L.19-p.203, L.15.)
Mr. Feltman went to trial. (See generally Tr. Vol. III, IV.) In Mr. Feltman's opening
statement, he told the jury that he "had a mental breakdown" at the time of the alleged offense.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.104, Ls.20-21.) He explained that he believed that he was possessed by the devil
and thought he was Jesus Christ. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.104, L.21-p.105, L.7, p.106, Ls.6-12.) He
also acknowledged, "And he was acting inappropriately. He was acting crazy. And ... I haven't
seen the State's case, but if the evidence does go to show that he was drunk, then I'll admit it
during closing statements and say, 'Find him guilty of that."' (Tr. Vol. III, p.105, Ls.2-7.)
In the State's case-in-chief, Sergeant Howe testified that, during the traffic stop,
Mr. Feltman was very agitated, crying, and uncooperative, and showed cyclical behavior, which
indicated intoxication. (State's Ex. 3; Tr. Vol. III, p.113, Ls.4-6, p.113, Ls.15-18, p.114, Ls.1516, p.114, L.25-p.115, L.16, p.116, Ls.5-18.) During a break in his testimony, the State
expressed concern that Mr. Feltman would testify about his "mental incapacitation or mental
insanity" and potentially argue for jury nullification. (Tr. Vol. III, p.118, Ls.13-22.) Mr. Feltman
responded that he had no intention of arguing for jury nullification, but he wanted to present
mental illness evidence to counter the State's impairment theory and provide an alternative
explanation for his conduct. (Tr. Vol. III, p.119, L.5-p.121, L.13.) The district court determined
that only an expert witness could testify about mental illness, so Mr. Feltman could not testify
about his mental health diagnosis or condition that night. (Tr., p.123, L.2-p.124, L.9.) The
district court further ruled that it would not "allow either side to reference the mental state of the
defendant other than his intoxication." (Tr., p.125, Ls.2--4.) After this ruling, the State presented
additional evidence of Mr. Feltman's mental state. The State's evidence showed that, from his

5

arrest until his removal from the patrol car in the sally port, Mr. Feltman continued to be angry,
tearful, and delusional (such as referring to himself as "your savoir," "Jesus Christ," and "your
redeemer"). (See State's Ex. 1 (all three video files); State's Ex. 3; Tr. Vol. III, p.129, Ls.20-22,
p.130, Ls.10-15, p.143, Ls.20-21, p.145, Ls.9-16, p.176, Ls.14-23, p.195, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Feltman
did not testify. (Tr. Vol. III, p.193, L.22-p.195, L.25.)
During the final jury instruction conference, Mr. Feltman stated that he had no objection
to the jury instructions. (Tr. Vol. III, p.197, Ls.16-18.) In closing argument, the prosecutor
emphasized to the jury that Mr. Feltman failed to present any evidence of his mental illness.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.216, Ls.16-25.) The prosecutor also asked the jury to "protect" Deputy Ballard
and "[g]ive him a fair shake of the evidence." (Tr. Vol. III, p.217, L.17.) In Mr. Feltman's
closing argument, he did not explicitly concede the DUI, but recognized that the State "likely"
met its burden. (Tr. Vol. III, p.222, Ls.9-14.) The jury found Mr. Feltman guilty as charged.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, Ls.12-23; R., p.133.) After the verdict, Mr. Feltman pled guilty to the
commission ofa prior DUI in the past ten years. (See Tr. Vol. IV, p.8, L.16-p.12, L.19.)
Before sentencing, the district court committed Mr. Feltman a second time because he
was deemed not competent to proceed with the case. (R., pp.183-84, 187-88.) A little over a
month later, the district court terminated his commitment. (R., pp.194-95.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Feltman to five years, with two years fixed, for propelling bodily fluids and one
year for the DUI. (Tr. Vol. V, p.28, Ls.1-6, p.28, Ls.11-13; R., pp.197, 198.) The district court
also retained jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. V, p.27, Ls.14-15, p.28, Ls.3-5; R., p.198.) Mr. Feltman
timely appealed. (R., pp.206-09.)

6

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by rejecting Mr. Feltman's proposed jury instructions on the
pretrial detainee element of propelling bodily fluids?

II.

Did the district court commit fundamental error by failing to instruct on jury on the
pretrial detainee element of propelling bodily fluids?

III.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove the pretrial detainee element of
propelling bodily fluids?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by prohibiting Mr. Feltman from testifying
about his mental illness at the time of the alleged offenses?

7

ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Erred By Rejecting Mr. Feltman's Proposed Jury Instructions On The Pretrial
Detainee Element Of Propelling Bodily Fluids
A.

Introduction
Mr. Feltman submits that the district court erred by rejecting his proposed jury

instructions on LC. § 18-915B's essential element that the defendant be "a sentenced prisoner or
pretrial detainee." The plain language of I.C. § 18-915B limits the statute's scope to sentenced
prisoners or pretrial detainees only. Moreover, the legislative intent of LC. § 18-915B was to
limit liability to those two categories. Therefore, the district court should have adopted
Mr. Feltman's instructions to properly instruct the jury on this essential element of propelling
bodily fluids.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court exercises free review over whether the district court has properly instructed the

jury. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). The Court also exercises free review over
statutory interpretation. State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015).

C.

The District Court Should Have Given Mr. Feltman's Instructions Because The
Defendant's Status As A Sentenced Prisoner or Pretrial Detainee Is An Essential Element
Of Propelling Bodily Fluids
"In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for their

information." LC. § 19-2132(a).
In other words, a trial court must deliver instructions on the rules of law that are
"material to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." State v.
Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 (Ct. App. 1999). This necessarily includes instructions
on the "nature and elements of the crime charged and the essential legal principles
applicable to the evidence that has been admitted." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170,
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172 (Ct. App. 2004). Each party is entitled to request the delivery of specific
instructions. However, such instructions will only be given if they are "correct
and pertinent." LC. § 19-2132. A proposed instruction is not "correct and
pertinent" if it is: (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2) adequately covered by
other instructions; or (3) "not supported by the facts of the case." State v. Olsen,
103 Idaho 278, 285 (1982).
Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11; accord State v. Meyer, 161 Idaho 631, 634-35 (2017). "When
reviewing jury instructions, this Court must first ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not
individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law." State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372
(2002) (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310 (1998)). Erroneous instructions amount to
reversible error if "the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011).
In this case, by rejecting Mr. Feltman's proposed instructions, the district court did not
correctly instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged crime. Idaho Code § 18-915B
reads in full:
Any person who is housed in a state, private or county correctional facility, work
release center or labor camp, or who is being transported or supervised by a
correctional officer or detention officer, irrespective of whether the person is a
sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee, and who knowingly propels any bodily
fluid or bodily waste at any detention officer, correctional officer, staff member,
private contractor or employee of a county or state correctional facility, or
authorized visitor to a county or state correctional facility, work release center or
labor camp, or who knowingly introduces any bodily fluid or bodily waste into
the food or drink of such officer, staff member, private contractor, employee or
authorized visitor, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in a
correctional facility for not more than five ( 5) years, and such sentence shall be
served consecutively to any sentence currently served.
LC. § 18-915B. The key portions for statutory interpretation here are: "[A]ny person ... who is
being transported or supervised by a ... detention officer, irrespective of whether the person is a
sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee, and who knowingly propels any bodily fluid ... at any
detention officer ... shall be guilty of a felony .... " LC.§ 18-915B (emphasis added). Looking
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at this pertinent language, its plain terms limit the initial reference of "any person" to only those
who qualify as "a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee." The same interpretation applies if the
Court determines that this language is ambiguous. The rules of statutory interpretation and the
legislative history also support an interpretation that limits "any person" to "a sentenced prisoner
or pretrial detainee." In short, unambiguous or not, LC. § 18-915B applies to sentenced prisoners
and pretrial detainees only.

1.

The plain language of LC. § 18-915B requires the defendant to be "a sentenced
prisoner or pretrial detainee" to be guilty of propelling bodily fluids

Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain language. This
Court considers the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and
ordinary meanings. When the statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's
clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and [the Court does] not need to go
beyond the statute's plain language to consider other rules of statutory
construction.

Owens, 158 Idaho at 3. "Provisions should not be read in isolation, but rather within the context
of the entire document ... The Court must give effect to all the words in the statute so that none
will be void or superfluous." State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 784 (2019). Examining the plain
language, "any person" must be qualified by "irrespective of whether the person is a sentenced
prisoner or pretrial detainee" to give effect to all the words in the statute.
First, "irrespective of whether" is akin to "regardless of whether," which, in turn, is like
"whether or not." THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 5.220 (16th ed. 2010); BRYAN A. GARNER,
GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 483, 857 (3d ed. 2009) ("whether" and "irrespective of');
THE REDBOOK, A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE § 12.3 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 3d ed. 2013).
"Whether or not" and "regardless of whether" generally precede a condition that modifies the
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sentence's main verb. 4 Applied here, "irrespective of whether the person is a sentenced prisoner
or a pretrial detainee" means the person is treated the same in either category-if the person is a
sentenced prisoner, and if the person is a pretrial detainee. Neither category changes the person's
liability.
Second, the entire "irrespective" phrase modifies the initial reference to "[ a]ny person
who is housed ... or who is being transported or supervised." LC. § 18-915B. The statute's first
broad reference "any" person is narrowed to "the person" who is either a "sentenced prisoner or
a pretrial detainee." Otherwise, the entire second phrase on sentenced prisoners and pretrial
detainees is superfluous. See Smalley, 164 Idaho at 784 (giving effect to all words in a statute so
none are superfluous). Both references to a "person" must be given meaning in the statute. To
give meaning to the second "person" reference, "a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee" must
define the first reference to "any person." Therefore, the plain language of I.C. § 18-915B
requires the person's status as either a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee to be an essential
element of propelling bodily fluids.

2.

If LC. § 18-915B is ambiguous, the rules of statutory construction require the
defendant to be "a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee" to be guilty of
propelling bodily fluids

If this Court determines that "irrespective of whether the person is a sentenced prisoner or

pretrial detainee" is ambiguous in its effect on "any person," legislative intent and the rules of
statutory construction support Mr. Feltman's proposed interpretation.
When this Court must engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity
exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that
4

For example, "he will visit her whether or not it rains" means he will visit her in either
situation-if it rains, and if it does not rain. Or, "he will visit her regardless of whether it rains,"
means, again, that he will visit her no matter if it rains. The "whether/regardless" conjunction
modifies the verb "visit."
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intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be
examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute
and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous
statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. Constructions of an
ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored.
State v. Coleman, 163 Idaho 671, 674 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Here, the legislature's
statement of purpose plainly indicates its intent to limit this statute to sentenced prisoners or
pretrial detainees. Further, this interpretation is consistent with the statute's context as a whole,
prevents an absurd result, and does not render the statute a nullity.
First, the legislature's statement of purpose demonstrates its intent to target sentenced
prisoners and pretrial detainees. The statement of purpose reads:
Persons working at correctional facilities have been the target of blood, urine,
saliva, semen, feces or a combination thereof thrown, spat or otherwise propelled
by inmates. Similarly, inmate cooks occasionally put bodily fluids or waste in
food or drinks served to such persons. No statute in Idaho currently covers such
conduct for all persons targeted who are working or visiting a jail or correctional
facility. This legislation not only puts inmates on notice that such behavior has
severe consequences, it would also improve the morale of correctional guards and
staff to know that such conduct is considered a felony by the legislature.
Statement of Purpose, Ch. 33, § 1, 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws 53 (emphasis added). The "severe
consequences" are a felony conviction and a maximum sentence of five years that "shall be
served consecutively to any sentence currently served." LC. § 18-915B. As evidenced by the
statement of purpose, the legislature intended to enact a specific law to deter inmates from
propelling bodily fluids on correctional facility workers or visitors by mandating a consecutive
sentence. The legislature did not intend to criminalize propelling bodily fluids by "any person"
interacting with correctional facility workers or visitors. The legislature's focus was on inmates.
Further, the "irrespective of' language does not indicate that the legislature had no concern about
a person's status as a sentenced prisoner, pretrial detainee, or otherwise. To the contrary, that
language indicates the legislature's intent to guarantee that both sentenced prisoners and pretrial
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detainees should be treated equally under the statute. By using "irrespective of," the legislature
wanted to ensure that pretrial detainees (who could be in custody for a significant period of time
awaiting trial) were not excluded from the statute's severe consequences and, thus, were also
deterred from such behavior. Thus, the legislative history endorses an interpretation of "any
person" qualified by "sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee."
Second, Mr. Feltman's proposed interpretation is in line with the statute as a whole and
prevents an absurd result of nullifying the statute. Looking at the text of I.C. § 18-915B, it
references people who are "housed" in prisons and "transported or supervised" by jail or prison
guards. It protects people employed by or visiting a prison or jail. The text indicates that
I.C. § 18-915B is not focused on punishing "any person" for propelling bodily fluids. The statute
is focused on individuals confined to jail or prison. For all other persons, liability for propelling
bodily fluids would fall under the general battery statute (I.C. § 18-901) or the statute prohibiting
assault or battery against certain personnel, including law enforcement officers and correctional
and detention workers (LC. § 18-915). The existence of these other battery statutes supports an
interpretation of I.C. § 18-915B restricted the categories of sentenced prisoners and pretrial
detainees. Otherwise, LC. § 18-915B is rendered meaningless because that conduct by "any
person" would fall under the other battery statutes. To avoid the absurd result of an entirely
superfluous statute, LC. § 18-915B must be confined to sentenced prisoners and pretrial
detainees.
In summary, if ambiguous, the legislative intent of LC. § 18-915B was to penalize
pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners for propelling bodily fluids at jail and prison workers
and visitors. The Court must give effect to that intent by interpreting "irrespective of whether the
person is a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee" as modifying "any person."
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3.

The district court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury to find
that Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee to be guilty of propelling bodily fluids

With these two categories in mind, the district court erred by rejecting Mr. Feltman's
proposed instruction on the "pretrial detainee" category. The "sentenced prisoner" category was
not at issue here because Mr. Feltman was not sentenced for, let alone found guilty of, another
crime when he spit on Deputy Ballard. As such, the jury had to make a finding on whether
Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee. Mr. Feltman's proposed definition of a pretrial detainee was
consistent with the statute's plain language and this Court's interpretation of the term. The
district court therefore erred by refusing these instructions.
Examining the statute's language and this Court's precedent, a pretrial detainee is a
person unable to post bail or denied bail after his or her first appearance before a judge. See
Idaho Criminal Rule ("I. C.R.") 5 (initial appearance before magistrate and setting bail); I. C.R. 10
(arraignment on indictment or information). Black's Law Dictionary does not define "pretrial
detainee," but it defmes "pretrial detention" as "[t]he holding of a defendant before trial on
criminal charges either because the established bail could not be posted or because release was
denied. Detention, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). According to this definition, a
"pretrial detainee" is a defendant held before trial on criminal charges unable to post bail or
having been denied release. The Court defined a "pretrial detainee" in a similar way, albeit in the
excessive force context. In determining when the arrest ended and the detention began, the Court
held:
The focus on arraignment as the break between arrest and detention makes sense
both from the legal standpoint and from the standpoint of common sense. It is at
the arraignment that the actions of the police in seizing the defendant are
either ratified or rejected. It is at the arraignment that a determination of probable
cause or lack thereof to hold and charge the arrestee is first made. And, it is at the
arraignment that the decision is made either to release or to detain the arrestee
pending trial. For all of these reasons, we conclude that, for purposes of
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determining whether the fourth amendment or fifth amendment constitutional
guarantees apply, a person is an arrestee until such time as he or she is arraigned
and a probable cause determination has been made.

Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 120 Idaho 69, 75-76 (1991) (for an excessive force claim,
concluding the plaintiffs were arrestees because they had not been arraigned). The legislature
enacted LC. § 18-915B in 2001-ten years after Grant's definition of pretrial detainee.
Ch. 33, § 1, 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws 53. "Statutes are construed under the assumption that the
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was
passed." State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 494 (2014) (quoting Druffel v. Idaho Dept. of Transp.,
136 Idaho 853, 856 (2002)). It must be assumed that the legislature was aware of the Court's
definition when enacting LC. § 18-915B, and therefore Grant's definition should apply here. As
proposed by Mr. Feltman below, a pretrial detainee is "a person who has been arrested and
brought before a judicial officer for arraignment on a charge, but who has not yet been tried on
the charge." (R., p.90.)
Because "sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee" is an essential element of propelling
bodily fluids, the district court committed reversible error by rejecting Mr. Feltman's proposed
instructions on this element. Mr. Feltman proposed that the propelling bodily fluids element
instruction contain an express pretrial detainee finding by the jury, and he requested a separate
instruction on the pretrial detainee definition. (R., pp.89-90.) These instructions were material to
the jury's determination of Mr. Feltman's guilt or innocence for spitting on Deputy Ballard. If
Mr. Feltman was not a pretrial detainee, he could not be guilty of this offense. The instructions
were also correct and pertinent because they were accurate statements of law and not covered by
any other instructions. As such, the district court's rejection of Mr. Feltman's proposed
instructions misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. Feltman. The district court committed reversible
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error by not instructing in the jury on the pretrial detainee element of propelling bodily fluids.

(See R., p.124; Tr. Vol. III, p.202, L.19-p.203, L.15.) Accordingly, Mr. Feltman respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for this offense and remand for a new
trial.
II.
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Failing To Instruct The Jury On The
"Pretrial Detainee" Element Of Propelling Bodily Fluids
A.

Introduction
If this Court determines that Mr. Feltman's jury instruction issue in Part I is not preserved

for appeal, Mr. Feltman raises this issue in the alternative pursuant to the fundamental error
doctrine. He asserts that his due process rights were violated by the district court's omission of
the pretrial detainee element of propelling bodily fluids. Mr. Feltman further argues that this
error is clear from the record, and it is not harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court freely reviews whether the district court properly instructed jury. Severson,

147 Idaho at 710.
When "the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error
doctrine." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). Under that doctrine, there
must be an error that violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; the error must plainly exist; and the error must not be
harmless. Id. The defendant has the burden of persuasion on these issues. Id.

State v. Hall, 161 Idaho 413, 422-23 (2016).
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C.

The District Court's Omission Of The "Pretrial Detainee" Element Violated
Mr. Feltman's Unwaived Due Process Rights, Is Clear From The Record, And Is Not
Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) provides: "No party may assign as error the giving of or

failure to give an instruction unless the party objects to the action before the jury retires to
consider its verdict. The objection must distinctly state the instruction to which the party objects
and the grounds of the objection." I.C.R. 30(b). In Hall, the Court applied this rule to hold that a
defendant did not preserve a jury instruction issue by "[ m]erely" submitting a proposed
instruction and memorandum in support, but not objecting during the final jury instruction
conference. 161 Idaho at 422. The Court held, "Rule 30(b) required that defense counsel object
to the failure to give the instruction during the jury instruction conference and state distinctly the
grounds of the objection." Id. Because the jury instruction issue was not preserved, the Court
reviewed it for fundamental error. Id. at 422-25.
Here, Mr. Feltman submits that his jury instruction issue is distinguishable from Hall,
even though he did not object at the final jury instruction conference. (Tr. Vol. III, p.197, Ls.1618.) Unlike the defendant in Hall, Mr. Feltman did not merely submit a proposed instruction and
memorandum in support. (R., pp.80-84.) The district court held two pretrial hearings on the
issue, Mr. Feltman argued in support of his proposed instructions, and the district court issued a
definitive ruling. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, II; see Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.13-p.15, L.23 (district
court's ruling).) Mr. Feltman argues that his pretrial motion and argument, and the district
court's explicit ruling, preserved the issue for appeal. Cf State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 793 &
n.4 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing cases) (in general, the trial court's denial of a motion in limine
preserves the issue for appeal). But, if this Court holds that Mr. Feltman was required to object
again at the final jury trial conference, he raises this claim as a fundamental error.
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1.

The district court's failure to instruct the jury on the "pretrial detainee" element
violated Mr. Feltman's unwaived due process rights

A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. U.S CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1 § 13. "The United States Supreme
Court has held that in criminal trials 'the State must prove every element of the offense, and a
jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement."' State v.

Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004)).
"An erroneous jury instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element of a
charged crime" can also be characterized "as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
guarantee." State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993)). "The first inquiry is
whether there was an error in the jury instruction." Hall, 161 Idaho at 423 (quoting State v.

Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 227 (2014)).
Here, to prove that Mr. Feltman was guilty of propelling bodily fluids, the State had to
prove that he was a pretrial detainee (or a sentenced prisoner) at the time of the alleged offense.
As discussed in Part I, Mr. Feltman's pretrial detainee status was an essential element of
LC.§ 18-915B. The jury was not instructed to find that Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee.
(R., p.124.) The district court used the State's proposed instructions, which omitted this element.

(Compare R., p.92, with R., p.124; Tr. Vol. III, p.202, L.19-p.203, L.15.) Lacking this essential
element, the State was relieved of its burden to prove all of the elements of propelling bodily
fluids beyond a reasonable doubt. This was an error in the jury instructions on this offense, and it
violated Mr. Feltman's unwaived due process rights. Therefore, Mr. Feltman has established the
first prong of the fundamental error standard to show a constitutional violation.
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2.

The constitutional error in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element is
clear from the record

The instructional error in this case plainly exists, and evidence in the record shows that
this constitutional violation was not a strategic decision by Mr. Feltman's counsel. The second
prong of the fundamental error standard requires "the error must be clear or obvious, without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The Court
clarified in State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 443 P.3d 129 (2019):
This means the record must contain evidence of the error and the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in
failing to object. ... [W]hether trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to
object is a claim that must be supported by evidence in the record. Appellate
counsel's opinion that the decision could not have been tactical does not satisfy
the second prong ....
443 P.3d at 133. Mr. Feltman has met this standard. First, the error is clear from the record
because it is apparent from the jury instructions and LC. § 18-915B. No additional information
beyond the record is needed to review this issue. Second, the record contains evidence that
Mr. Feltman's trial counsel did not make a strategic decision not to object-Mr. Feltman's
counsel proposed the correct instruction with the "pretrial detainee" element. (See R., pp.80-84,
87, 89-90.) Any failure to renew this request at the final jury instruction conference was not
tactical. There is no strategic reason why Mr. Feltman's counsel would suddenly want incorrect
jury instructions that relieved the State of its burden to prove the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Mr. Feltman has established the second prong of
the fundamental error standard to show a clear error.

19

3.

The constitutional error in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element is not
harmless

Finally, this error is not harmless. Under prong three of fundamental error, the defendant
must "demonstrate that the clear error in the record-i. e., the error identified in the first and
second prongs-actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Whether the error
affected the trial proceedings must be clear from the appellate record." Miller, 443 P.3d atl3334. It is clear from the record here that this instructional error actually affected the trial's
outcome. Before trial, the State conceded that it could not satisfy the pretrial detainee element if
the district court interpreted LC. § 18-915B in Mr. Feltman's favor. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.18-p.9,
L.3.) Consistent with the State's concession, there was no evidence at trial for the jury to find
Mr. Feltman's status as a "pretrial detainee." Mr. Feltman had not been arraigned, or even
booked into the jail, when he spit on Deputy Ballard. (Tr. Vol. III, p.147, Ls.14-16.) His first
appearance before the magistrate occurred two days later. (R., p.24.) Therefore, this error
actually affected the outcome because the jury would not have found Mr. Feltman guilty if
properly instructed on the essential elements of propelling bodily fluids.
In sum, the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the "pretrial detainee" element of
propelling bodily fluids was fundamental error. Mr. Feltman respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his judgment of conviction for this offense and remand for a new trial.

III.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove The "Pretrial Detainee" Element Of
Propelling Bodily Fluids
A.

Introduction
Mr. Feltman argues that the State did present sufficient evidence for the jury to find him

guilty of propelling bodily fluids. Specifically, he asserts that the State presented no evidence on
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the essential element that Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee at the time of the offense. Due to
the insufficient evidence, Mr. Feltman respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment
of conviction for this offense and remand for a judgment of acquittal.

B.

Standard Of Review
"This Court will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury
verdict, where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,
285 (2003). "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it
and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven."
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015). A conviction can be based primarily
upon circumstantial evidence, State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50-51 (1969), and
"even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also
gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt," Severson, 147 Idaho at 712.

State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 790 (2017). The Court does not substitute its "judgment for that of
the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546 (quoting State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,
460 (2012)). The Court views "the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Id.
(quoting Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 460).

C.

The State Did Not Meet Its Burden To Prove Mr. Feltman Was A Pretrial Detainee
Mr. Feltman argues that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's

guilty verdict for propelling bodily fluids. The State has the burden to prove all elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a part of that
due process, "no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense."
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Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 545 (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)). “[E]ven when it can
be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” “a properly
instructed jury may occasionally convict.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).
Appellate review of sufficiency is limited in scope, however. Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 545. The
inquiry is not whether the Court would find the defendant guilty, but whether any rational jury
could have found that the State met its burden to prove each essential element with substantial
evidence. Id. at 546.
In this case, the State did not meet its burden to prove the essential element of pretrial
detainee status. Similar to Mr. Feltman’s harmless error argument in Part II.C.3, the State
presented no evidence on Mr. Feltman’s status as a pretrial detainee—likely due to the State’s
concession that it could not prove this element. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.18–p.9, L.3.) Mr. Feltman’s
first appearance before a magistrate occurred two days after the incident. (R., p.24.) To this end,
the State’s only evidence on Mr. Feltman’s status showed that he was still an arrestee. Sergeant
Howe testified that Mr. Feltman had not even been booked into the jail at the time of the spitting.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.147, Ls.14–16.) Therefore, the State did not present substantial evidence to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Feltman was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged
offense. Due to the insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, Mr. Feltman respectfully
requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for propelling bodily fluids and
remand for a judgment of acquittal.
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IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Prohibiting Mr. Feltman From Testifying About His
Mental Illness At The Time Of The Alleged Offenses
A.

Introduction
Mr. Feltman asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his

testimony about his mental illness at the time of the offense. Specifically, he contends that the
district court did not act consistently with the legal standards because the district court ruled that
Mr. Feltman could only present mental health evidence through an expert as required by
LC.§ 18-207. This statute allows expert evidence on state of mind if it is an element of the
offense. But, contrary to the district court's ruling, this statute does not restrict a lay witness's
testimony on mental health. By ruling that this statute barred Mr. Feltman from testifying about
his own mental illness, the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of

discretion standard. State v. Anderson, 162 Idaho 610, 614 (2017) (citation omitted). The Court
considers four factors: "[w ]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). Statutory
interpretation is reviewed de novo. Owens, 158 Idaho at 3.
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Barred Mr. Feltman's Testimony On His Mental Health Diagnosis And Condition
Idaho Code § 18-207 states, "Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of

criminal conduct." LC. § 18-207(1 ). This rule, however, is not "intended to prevent the
admission of expert evidence on the issue of any state of mind which is an element of the
offense, subject to the rules of evidence." LC. § 18-207(3). "That is, a defendant may present
evidence of a mental disease or defect to negate the intent or other mens rea element of the
charged crime." State v. Santistevan, 143 Idaho 527, 529-30 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v.

Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 635-36 (1990); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 621 (1985); State v.
Patterson, 126 Idaho 227,229 (Ct. App. 1994)). If a party intends to present "any expert witness
on any issue of mental condition," the proponent of the evidence must meet strict notice
requirements. LC. § 18-207(4)(a)-(b). These notice requirements "allow the opposing party a
complete opportunity to consider the substance of such testimony and prepare for rebuttal."

State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) ( citing LC. § 18-207(4)( a)).
Here, the district court interpreted LC. § 18-207 to bar Mr. Feltman from testifying about
his own mental health diagnosis and condition. During a break in Sergeant Howe's testimony,
the prosecutor raised an issue with Mr. Feltman testifying about his "mental incapacitation or
mental insanity" and potentially arguing for jury nullification. (Tr. Vol. III, p.118, Ls.13-22.)
Mr. Feltman responded that he intended to present mental health evidence as an alternative
explanation for his behavior on the night in question. (Tr. Vol. III, p.119, Ls.5-13.) He pointed
out that the State was "putting on a lot of evidence that he's acting this way ... and saying crazy
things because he's drunk" to prove the impairment theory. (Tr. Vol. III, p.119, Ls.6-8, p.120,
Ls.9-12.) "[I]f they're showing he's acting crazy because he's drunk," Mr. Feltman argued, "I
think I can show he's acting crazy because he's crazy." (Tr. Vol. III, p.120, Ls.13-15.)
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Mr. Feltman also confirmed that he was not arguing for jury nullification. (Tr. Vol. III, p.121,
Ls.10–13.) Rather, he wanted to give an “alternate explanation for . . . his behavior as far as . . .
the alcohol goes.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.121, Ls.12–13.) In response, the prosecutor agreed that “it’s
fair for the Defendant to say he was crazy in regard to explaining away his actions,” but he
disagreed that Mr. Feltman could testify about his diagnosis. (Tr. Vol. III, p.121, L.16–p.122,
L.3.) The prosecutor also objected to any use of Mr. Feltman’s mental health to challenge his
mental state for propelling bodily fluids. (Tr. Vol. III, p.122, Ls.4–13.) After a lunch recess, the
district court ruled:
When we broke for lunch, the Court took under advisement the issue of
whether or not the Defendant would be aloud [sic] to introduce evidence of
potential mental illness during the course of the trial.
During lunch, the Court did go back and review relevant statutes and
relevant cases related to this particular issue. I will note the statute that is
applicable in this case is Idaho Code Section 18-207. Section 1 begins with the
caveat that mental conditions shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct. Paren 3 continues that nothing herein is intended to prevent the
admission of expert evidence on the issue of any state of mind which is an
element of the offense subject to the Rules of Evidence, so -And I don’t know – I’m still a little bit clear on -- unclear on where the
Defense is going with the issue of mental illness, but with respect to the statute, I
do find that unless the Defense has an expert witness ready to testify as to the
mental illness of the Defendant, the Court is not going to allow any reference to
mental illness, including the Defendant offering testimony as to what his
diagnosis is.
With respect to expert testimony on this issue, there are certain rules that
apply, including 90 days’ notice and other caveats as well. So the Court’s ruling
on this issue is we’re not going to get into the mental illness issue.
I will note for the record that, in this case, there was an [I.C. §] 18-211
Motion that was filed. I believe that the Defendant was transported to State
Hospital South. We did receive a favorable -- when I say “favorable,” I mean an
opinion that indicates that the Defendant is competent to proceed in these
proceedings, which of course does not address his state of mind at the time the
incident occurred. But under my ruling, with respect to 18-207, I am not going to
allow evidence of mental illness.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.123, L.2–p.124, L.9 (emphasis added).) Mr. Feltman then expressed concern
about the prosecutor claiming he was “faking his mental illness” and being unable to respond.
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(Tr. Vol. III, p.124, Ls.12–23.) He also noted a report from a doctor and the State Hospital to
dispute the State’s malingering claims. (Tr. Vol. III, p.124, Ls.14–19.) While the district court
did not recall any past argument on “faking it,” the district court clarified that it was “not going
to allow either side to reference the mental state of the defendant other than his intoxication. And
intoxication is obviously not a defense to the mens rea about the spitting.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.125,
Ls.1–4.) The prosecutor added that he now agreed with the district court that Mr. Feltman could
not introduce any mental health evidence to respond to the impairment theory in light of
I.C. § 18-207. (Tr. Vol. III, p.125, Ls.8–13.)
The district court’s evidentiary ruling on Mr. Feltman’s mental health evidence was
inconsistent with the applicable legal standards. Idaho Code § 18-207 simply did not apply,
unless Mr. Feltman intended to call an expert to testify about his mental health. The relevant
plain language of I.C. § 18-207 does two things: (1) it eliminates the insanity defense, but (2) it
still allows expert evidence on state of mind subject to strict notice requirements. These
provisions are inapplicable for lay witness testimony on mental health. Moreover, I.C. § 18-207
does not alter the admissibility of such evidence under the Idaho Rules of Evidence (“I.R.E.”). In
fact, I.C. § 18-207 indicates that any expert evidence must meet the evidentiary standards. See
I.C. § 18-207(3) (expert evidence on state of mind is permissible “subject to the rules of
evidence”). Moreover, the I.R.E. allows lay witness opinion testimony. I.R.E. 701 (allowing lay
witness testimony if certain factors are met). Likewise, Idaho appellate courts have recognized
that a lay witness can testify on “the cause of a medical condition” or “alleged injuries” if they
“are of a common nature and arise from a readily identifiable cause.” Dodge-Farrar v. Am.
Cleaning Servs. Co., 137 Idaho 838, 842 (Ct. App. 2002); accord Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho
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195, 204 n.3 (2014) (Horton, J., concurring); Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 908 (Ct. App.
2005).
Here, the district court did not examine whether Mr. Feltman’s testimony was permissible
lay witness testimony on a medical condition and relevant to the charged offenses. Instead, the
district court ruled that any mental illness evidence was inadmissible because Mr. Feltman did
not have an expert and did not provide notice. This was error. The district court incorrectly
interpreted I.C. § 18-207 to govern all mental health evidence and then improperly applied its
interpretation to limit Mr. Feltman to only expert evidence on his mental illness.
Due to the district court’s incorrect interpretation and application of I.C. § 18-207, the
district court did not apply the correct legal standards when it barred Mr. Feltman’s testimony on
his mental illness. Mr. Feltman’s counsel planned to call Mr. Feltman to testify about his mental
health diagnosis and his condition on the night of his arrest. (Tr. Vol. III, p.119, L.5–p.121,
L.13.) There was no mention of an expert witness (other than Mr. Feltman’s response to the
district court’s ruling). In accordance with the I.R.E., Mr. Feltman could have testified about his
mental illness and his condition that night. “Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” I.R.E. 401. Mr. Feltman’s diagnosis and condition were
relevant to explain his behavior on the night of the offenses and to refute the State’s impairment
theory. As argued by his counsel, Mr. Feltman could have explained that he was not acting
“crazy” because he was intoxicated, but because he was mentally ill. (Tr. Vol. III, p.119, Ls.5–
13, p.120, Ls.8–15, p.120, L.22–p.121, L.13.) This evidence makes it less probable that
Mr. Feltman was intoxicated under the State’s impairment theory. Therefore, the district court
did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it barred this evidence.
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In sum, Mr. Feltman submits the district court abused its discretion by excluding this
evidence, and the State cannot prove this error was harmless. 5

5

Due to Miller's fundamental error standard, Mr. Feltman notes, but does not raise, prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument with regard to this evidentiary ruling. During opening
statements, Mr. Feltman told the jury that he had "a mental breakdown" and was delusional that
night. (Tr. Vol. III, p.104, L.20-p.105, L.3, p.106, Ls.6-12.) Later, as discussed above, the
district court ruled that Mr. Feltman's mental illness evidence was inadmissible. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.123, L.2-p.124, L.9.) Mr. Feltman complied with the district court's ruling and offered no
mental health evidence. The prosecutor, however, ignored the district court's ruling and
criticized Mr. Feltman's failure to present any mental health evidence to the jury. The prosecutor
argued in closing:
The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in their opening statements, closing
arguments and at other times is included to help you interpret the evidence but is
not evidence.
Mr. Andersen's opening statement, mental illness. This is a case about the
Defendant having some kind of history of blacking out at times, having a bad
breakup, where he legitimately started to believe he was Jesus Christ. Did you
hear any evidence of that at trial?
You heard the Defendant saying he was Jesus Christ when he was very
intoxicated that night. What you didn 't hear was anything else that Mr. Andersen
said. Nothing. That is not evidence, and you are not to consider it.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.216, Ls.12-25.) Mr. Feltman asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
arguing to the jury that Mr. Feltman did not deliver on his opening statement to present mental
health evidence to the jury. The prosecutor improperly capitalized on the district court's adverse
ruling that barred Mr. Feltman from presenting such evidence. Although Miller precludes a
prosecutorial misconduct claim, Mr. Feltman maintains that the State will be unable to show this
evidentiary error was harmless in light of the prosecutor exploiting the district court's ruling to
disparage defense counsel.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Feltman respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction for
propelling bodily fluids and remand his case to the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal
on that charge. In the alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction for one or both offenses and remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2019.
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